recent World Bank multi-country study of policies affecting agricultural price incentives over the past 5 decades. That study includes 75 countries that together account for 92 percent of the world's population and agricultural GDP and 95 percent of total GDP. The sample countries also account for more than 85 percent of farm production and employment in each of Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and the transition economies of Europe.
Specifically, this paper summarizes estimates of the nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents (NRAs and CTEs) for more than 70 different farm products, with an average of almost a dozen per country. Not all countries had data for the entire period, but the average number of years covered is 41 per country. Having such a comprehensive coverage of countries, products and years offers the prospect of obtaining a reliable picture of long-term trends in price-distorting policies (as well as annual fluctuations around those trends, not reported here) for country groups, regions, and the world as a whole.
The paper begins with a summary of the methodology used to generate annual indicators of the extent of government interventions in markets, details of which are provided in . The NRA and CTE estimates are then summarized across regions and over the half-decades since the mid-1950s. A summary is also provided of an additional set of indicators of agricultural price distortions that are based on the trade restrictiveness index first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) and modified for the Bank's research project by Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) . Then a new set of results from a global economy-wide model provide quantification of the impacts on global agricultural trade of the reforms since the early 1980s and of the policies still in place as of 2004. The paper concludes by drawing on the lessons learned to speculate on the prospects for further reform.
Methodology
Government-imposed distortions can create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product is computed as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government's intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). A weighted average NRA for all covered products is derived using the value of production at undistorted prices as weights (unlike the producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (2008) , which are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price). To that NRA for covered products is added a 'guesstimate' of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 percent of the total value of farm production) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation. Since the 1980s governments of some high-income countries have also provided socalled 'decoupled' assistance to farmers but, because that support in principle does not distort resource allocation, its NRA has been computed separately and is not included for direct comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for developing countries. Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable farm products.
Also computed is a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, where NRAag t and NRAnonag t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 1 Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since the weighted average NRAnonag t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country's sectoral policy regime has an anti-(pro-)agricultural bias.
Also considered is the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is calculated by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions.
1 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables.
The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production. In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across industries within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation of the covered industries' NRAs. However, it is helpful to have a single indicator of the overall welfare effect of each country's regime of agricultural price distortions in place at any time, and to trace its path over time and make cross-country comparisons. To that end, the family of indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) , under the catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes, are drawn upon. respectively each capture in a single indicator the direct welfare-or trade-reducing effects of distortions to consumer and producer prices of covered farm products from all agricultural and food price and trade policy measures in place (while ignoring non-covered farm products and indirect effects of sectoral and trade policy measures directed at non-agricultural sectors).
Specifically, the TRI (or WRI) is that ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly to all farm commodities in a country that year would generate the same reduction in trade (or economic welfare) as the actual cross-commodity structure of agricultural NRAs and CTEs for that country, other things equal.
The WRI measure reflects the partial equilibrium welfare cost of agricultural pricedistorting policies better than the NRA because it recognizes that the welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price wedge. It thus captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of assistance or taxation, and is larger than the mean NRA/CTE and is positive regardless of whether the government's agricultural policy is favoring or hurting farmers. 
Estimates of the changing extent of agricultural price distortions
This section first presents aggregate results for the world as a whole, and then provides more details of the results for Asia in particular, where the evolution of price distortions have been more dramatic than in any other region.
Global findings
The global summary of the new results from the World Bank project is provided in Figure 1 .
It reveals that the nominal rate of assistance to farmers in high-income countries rose steadily countries has increased at virtually the same pace as that in high-income countries. This suggests that growth in agricultural protection from import competition is something that begins at low levels of per capita income rather than being a phenomenon exclusive to highincome countries.
The improvement in farmers' incentives in developing countries is understated by the above NRA estimates, because those countries have also reduced their assistance to producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, most notably manufactures. The decline in the weighted average NRA for the latter, depicted in Figure 3 , was clearly much greater than the increase in the average NRA for tradable agricultural sectors for the period to the mid-1980s, consistent with the finding two decades ago of Valdés (1988, 1991) . equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative price of farm products, which is a huge change in the fortunes of developing country farmers in just a generation. This is mostly because of the changes in Asia, but even for Latin America this relative price hike is one-half, while for Africa this indicator improves by only one-eighth. As for high-income countries, assistance to manufacturing was on average much less than assistance to farmers, even in the 1950s, and its decline since then has had only a minor impact on that group's average RRA indicate that the trade-reducing impact of agricultural policies for developing countries as a group was roughly constant until the early 1990s and thereafter it declined, while for highincome countries the decline in TRI began a few years later (Figure 4 (a)). The TRI for developing countries is driven by the exportables subsector which was being taxed until recently and the import-competing subsector which was, and is increasingly, being protected (albeit less than in high-income countries -see Figure 2 above). For high-income countries, policies have supported both exporting and import-competing agricultural products and, even though they strongly favour the latter, the assistance to exporters has offset somewhat the anti-trade bias from the protection of import-competing producers.
The WRI estimates, shown in Figure 4 (b), indicate a steady rise from the 1960s to the 1980s for agricultural policies, but some decline in the 1990s. This reflects the fact that
NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite directions) away from zero in the first half of the period under study and then converged toward zero in the most recent quarter-century. That meant that their weighted average NRA traces out a fairly flat trend whereas the WRI traces out a hill-shaped path and thus provides a less misleading indicator of the trend in resource misallocation in world agricultural markets.
Findings for Asia 3
From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, agricultural price and trade policies reduced earnings of farmers in developing Asia on average by more than 20 percent; but that implicit taxation declined from the early 1980s and, from the mid-1990s, the NRA switched sign and became increasingly positive. That average hides considerable diversity within the region, however.
Nominal assistance to farmers in Korea and Taiwan was positive from the early 1960s (although very small initially when compared with the 40+ percent in Japan), Indonesia had some years in the 1970s and 1980s when its NRA was a little above zero (as did Pakistan prior to Bangladesh becoming an independent country in 1971), and India's and the Philippines' average NRAs became positive from the 1980s (Table 1) .
percent for sugar in Bangladesh. There is a great deal of NRA diversity also across commodities within each Asian economy's farm sector, and the extent (as measured by the standard deviation) has grown rather that diminished over the past five decades, from a regional average of less than 40 percent in the early years under study to more than 55 percent in recent years. This suggests there is still much that could be gained from improved resource reallocation both between Asian economies and within the agricultural sector of individual Asian economies, were differences in rates of assistance to be reduced.
That possibility of trade and welfare gains from further reform is underscored by the estimates of WRIs and TRIs for Asian countries, which are reported in Tables 3 and 4 . For Japan and Korea, their TRIs are very similar to their high NRAs (c.f. Table 1) , since all major farm products are importable and most are highly protected. Taiwan's TRI until recently was negative, reflecting the fact that its rice producers were assisted even when the island was a significant exporter. China's TRI was always positive and quite high in the 1980s and 1990s, because of the strong implicit taxes on both exports and imports of farm products. India's TRI was even higher, peaking in the latter 1980s and still high compared with China's and those for other South Asian countries. The TRIs for Southeast Asia are generally smaller, but vary considerably across countries and over time.
The WRIs are necessarily positive and generally much higher than the NRAs. For
China and India they have become considerably smaller over the past two decades, but they have declined little in such countries as Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka (Table 4) , reflecting the fact that a wide range of NRAs still prevail in those countries.
The anti-agricultural policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural policies.
Also important to changes in incentives affecting inter-sectorally mobile resources have been the significant reductions in border protection to the manufacturing sector (which has been the dominant intervention in the tradables part of non-agricultural sectors). That reduction in assistance to producers of non-farm tradables has been even more responsible for the improvement in farmer incentives than the reduction in direct taxation of agricultural industries. For Asia as a whole, the average NRA estimates for non-farm tradables declined steadily throughout the past four or five decades as policy reforms spread. This contributed to a decline in the estimated negative relative rate of assistance for farmers: the weighted average RRA was worse than -50 percent up to the early 1970s, but it improved to an average of -32 percent in the 1980s, -9 percent in the 1990s and is now positive, averaging 7 percent in 2000-04 (Table 1) . Table 1 ).
Of the striking changes in RRAs shown for individual economies over the past two decades, it is the move from negative to positive RRAs for China and India that matter most for the region -and indeed for the world. The extent of the decline in the non-agricultural NRA since the early 1980s is very similar for those two key countries, but the agricultural NRA has differed: in China the 5-year averages have risen steadily from -45 percent to 6 percent, whereas in India it has been close to zero except for a spike upward when international food prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, and for a rise in the present decade ( Figure 5 ).
This dramatic rise in the RRA for the world's two most populous countries is of great significance to the current analyses of the causes of the international food price rises of the present decade. One of the contributors is said to be the growing appetite for food imports by these two countries as they industrialize and their per capita incomes rise. Yet both countries have remained very close to self sufficient in agricultural products over the past four decades.
Undoubtedly the steady rise in their RRAs has contributed to that outcome ( Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 per cent higher than it would have been without the reforms of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional gain in nonagricultural value added. If the price and trade policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in developing countries would rise a further 5.6 per cent, compared with just 1.9 per cent for non-agricultural value added. In addition, unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farms -would see their returns rise more than returns on other productive factors from that liberalisation. Together, these findings suggest that both inequality and poverty could be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world's poor are farmers in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008) .
Prospects for further agricultural reform
The expectation is that, provided they remain open and continue to free up domestic markets and practice good macroeconomic governance, developing economies will keep growing rapidly in the foreseeable future once the current global recession passes The growth in Asia will be more rapid in manufacturing and service activities than in agriculture, and in the more densely populated economies of the region that growth will be accompanied by rapid increases in per capita incomes of low-skilled workers where labor-intensive exports boom. Table 1 .2). Another indicator of reluctance about agricultural trade reform is the demand by many developing countries to be allowed to maintain their rates of agricultural protection for reasons of food security, livelihood security and rural development. This view has succeeded in bringing 'special products' and a 'special safeguard mechanism' into the multilateral trading system's agricultural negotiations, even though such policies, which would raise domestic food prices in developing countries, may worsen poverty and reduce the food security of the poor, and would exacerbate instability in international markets for farm products. Given these developments, it is especially unfortunate that the WTO's Doha Development Agenda is struggling to deliver a new liberalizing agreement, and makes it more likely that developing countries will follow the same agricultural protection path this century as that taken last century by high-income countries. 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995- pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively , and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively . This NRA assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably even lower in earlier years, according to the authors of those country case studies. c Weighted averages of the above national averages, using weights based on gross value of national agricultural production at undistorted prices. d Simple average of the standard deviation around a weighted mean of the national RRAs for the region each year.
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